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In socialist econiomiies,  profitable firimis  are taxed to subsidize
unprofitable  ones, and productive workers subsidize unproduc-
tive workers.  YIugosla3v  firmis,  Vodopivec concluides,  produce  job
less becauilse  of b<oth  types of redistribution.
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'I'his paper  --  a product  o lthc Socialist  Ecolloml  ics  l)ivision,  Countrv  Econiomilics Departmcnt  - is part
of' a larger clTort in l'RE to investicate  thl  ehhavior  of finms in socialist cconomies. Copies are available
t'ree from the W'orld Bank. 1818 11  Strect N  W,  ashinoton  DC 2(433.  Plcasc .ontac'  Iulia Lutz, room N6-
(037,  extinsion  3697() (39 pages).
Socialism  as practiced  in E-asteni Europe  is  *  Impose  positive  interest  rates (in rcal terms)
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pression  ot' personial income  difTferentials w ithinl  redistribution  - that ill-defined  property  rights,
a firm.  together  with a monopany  political  system,
generate  suLh redistribution.  Changing  that
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praised  onr the COutit  (C ejLit\  eilthr.
'I'hc pea.ctful revolutions  in Eastern  Europe
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More  Lic tltlt  ! v.  ii hc ItlC isN'LU  0t  illtrtimiT  tons,  painful  process.
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sttou ld:  Intcrtirnn and  intraliinn redisurbution  shlould
be. abozl  cshed and  a social  saetel\  nct  establishIed
*  Stkop  JS  idSUh  lid/i  le  terp  i  se  rom e t  hlier  one that (tlos  niot  ham per clt'icicnc  (as inl
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Socialism  as  practiced  in  Eastein  Europe  Is  characterized  by  massive
Income  redistribution.  Its  most  evident  form is  subsidization  of consumption
(basic  food items,  housing),  but  there  Is  also  more  subtle  and  pervasive
redistribution  In  the  form  of (1)  lnterfirm  redistribution,  consisting  of
taxing  profitable  firms  in  order  to subsidize  unprofitable  ones,  and (ii)
intrafirm  redistribution,  consisting  of the  compression  of personal  earnings
differentials  within  a firm.  The  redistribution  of the  latter  two  types  Is  of
very  specific  nature  - It  amounts  to  bailing  out (i.e.,  avoiding  bankruptcy)
and/or  increasing  the  earnings  of the  ailing  or less  productive  firms/workers,
all  this  at the  expense  of the  more  productive  ones.
The  systematic  pattern  of the  socialist  redistribution  of Income  provides
protection  and  security,  and  thus  yields  Insurance  to  workers,  giving  rise  to
the  moral  hazard  problem.  Kornai,  the  originator  of the  soft-budget-constraint
concept  (which  Is closely  related  to the  above  mentioned  interfirm
redistribution),  and the  literature  spurred  by his  work,  mostly  focus  on
allocative  Inefficiencies  resulting  from  "softness"  of the  budget  faced  by
socialist  firms  (e.g.,  Kornai,  1980).  Much  less  attention  has  been  paid  to
another  consequence  of socialist  redistribution,  namely  the  dampening  effect
of redistribution  on  work incentivesI  (indeed,  Koriiai  (1986a)  even incorrectly
attributes  the  dampening  effect  to  the  randomness  of redistribution).  Yet,  it
has  been  found  that  low  productive  efficiency  (which  can  be attributed  to
ITo  deduce  that  the  redistribution  dampens  work incentives  one  must  assume,  as
shown  later,  some  sort  of profit  sharing;  as a rule,  this is  the  case in
Eastern  Europe.
1inappropriate  work  motivation)  is  a very  serious  problem  in  Yugoslavia,  and
the  sa  is  likely  to  be true  for  Eastern  Europe  In  general.
The  claim  that  workers  in  socialist  firms  lack  adequate  motivation
contrasts  with the  findings  of the  empirical  literature  on  worker
participation  in  Western  economies.  In  general,  the  above  literature  finds
that  worker  participation  increases  workers'  motivation,  and  thus  their
productivity.  3Since workers  In socialist  firms  participate  in  profit-sharing
and  decision-making,  one  might  expect  higher  productivity  in socialist  firms
as compared  with capitalist  ones.  In  reality,  however,  the  opposite  seems  to
be true,  and  one  can  easily  account  for  the  actual  lack  of  motivation  in
socialist  firms  once the  redistributive  aspect  of socialist  economies  is  also
taken  into  account.  The literature  on the  self-managed  firm (and,  as a special
case,  on the  Yugoslav  firm),  preoccupied  with  narrow  minded  "Illyrian
analysis",  has so  far ignored  the  redistributive  aspects  of socialist
2Bajt (1984,  p. 38)  blames  "insufficient  quality  and  intensity  of work,
together  with the  organization  of  production  process"  for  the  low  labor
productivity  in Yugoslavia.  Furthermore,  Bateman  et al (1988)  provide  a
specific  support  for the  claim  that  redistribution  affects  work  motivation  by
finding  that  investment  transfers  (grants!)  from  more  developed  to less
developed  regions  of Yugoslavia  impaired  the  productive  efficiency  in  firms  in
the  less  developed  regions.
3For a recent  review  of the  literature,  see  Blinder  (1990).
4Following  Ward (1958),  there  has  been  a huge  stream  of literature  simply
paralleling  the  analysis  of the  capitalist  firm in  all  aspects  except  imposing
income  per  worker  maximization  instead  of  profit  maximization.  Ward,  quite
aptly,  named  his  firm  an "Illyrian"  one.  Many  of  his  numerous  followers,
2economies,  and  was  therefore  unable  to  explain  the  apparent  lack  of incentive
in real-world  socialist  firms.
The  model  below  c_iptures  the  main redistributive  institutions  of
socialist  firms  and  possesses  several  desirable  features.  First,  instead  of
the  unrealistic  assumption  of identical  workers  commonly  found  in  the
self-management  literature,  the  model  assumes  differences  in  productivity
among  workers,  allowing  one  explicitly  to  address  differentials  in  personal
incomes.  Second,  the  treatnent  of firms  as monolithic  entities  is  supplanted
by a broader  view that  allows  for  multiple  decisio.  making  in  providing  work
effort.  Third,  the  replacement  of the  traditionally  used  income  per  worker
postulate  with  maximization  of  utility  enables  a direct  exploration  of the
consequences  of the  t'.  types  of redistribution  described  above  on firm
productivity  (a  novelty  in  the  self-management  literature).  Fourth,  the  model
allows  for  testing  the  effects  of  self-management  on productivity.
The  theoretical  model  capturing  the  productivity  effects  of
redistribution  and  worker  participation  is  developed  in  Section  2, together
with its  empirical  implications  (for  the  sake  of brevity,  the  institutional
details  of the  Yugoslav  firm,  providing  the  starting  point  for  the
construction  of the  model,  are limited  to  brief  remaarks  underpinning  the
crucial  steps  of the  modeling).  The  estimating  framework  and the  results  of
the  empirical  analysis  obtained  on the  basis  of a sample  of Slovenian
enterprises  are  presented  in  Section  3.  A brief  discussion  of policy
implications  concludes.
however,  take  it for  a Yugoslav  one  even  though  the  resemblance  is Indeed  as
remote  as the  millennia  elapsed  from  times  of ancient  Illyria  suggest.
32.  THE  MODEL
The  asu  mptions
The  most Important  assumptions  are the  following:
(a)  The  model  is  short-term:  the  capital  stock,  the  number  of  workers,  the
quality  of intrafirm  communication  channels,  and interfirm  redistribution
parameters  are  assumed  tc  be predetermined.
(b)  In  focusing  on distribution,  the  'echnology  Is  kept  very  simple:  I  assume
linear  homogeneity  and  Leontief  technology.
(c)  Full information:  each  worker  knows  not  only  his  own  productivity  and
effort  actually  exerted,  but  also  the  productivity  and  effort  of everybody
else In the  firm. 5
(d)  Workers  of the  firm  do not  collude  or engage  In logrolling.
Ce)  There  is  no uncertainty  about  the  future  states  of the  world.
(f)  The  model  is  static.
The  definitions
Let  a firm  consist  of  N workers  who  differ  in  productivity  but  have
identical  preferences  (utility  functions).  Let  the  production  function  be
Leontief  and linear  homogeneous  in labor  input  L: Q =  Q(L,  F1,...,F) = L
5This  rules  out  the  problem  of adverse  selection  and  of moral  hazard  arising
in team  production.  Such  a treatment  Is  simplistic,  but the  distortion
introduced  by it In  the  case  of the  self-managed  firm  may  not  be too  severe
because,  first,  the  units  in  question  are  relatively  small  (averaging
approximately  200  workers),  and  second,  the  workers  of a self-managed  firm
have  better  communication  channels  available,  and  hence  they  know  each  other
better.
4q(k  ,  ... ,  k ),  whore  F, Is  the  i-th  production  Input  (one  of them  being
capital),  and  k 1 - FI/L,  I  - 1, ... ,  K. Let  the  overall  labor  input  of the
firm,  L, be the  sum  of contractual  labor  Input,  Lo,  and  non-contractual  labor
N  N
Input,  L:  L  =  E+  Lo  xZ  e0 and  L  =n  x,el,  where  x  Is  the
1=1  1=1
productivity  of  worker  i,  el  =  e (e  (I))  is  his  provision  of effort  over  and
above  a minimum  effort  e 0 necessary  to retain  a lob,  and  e  =  (e  ,...,e
e1+ ...  DeK)  the  provision  of  effort  of all  other  workers  except  the i-th  one.
Correspondingly,  let  us  define  Y, the  Income  generated  by the  firm,  as
K  N  K
Y  =  pQ  - Z pi  F-  (pq  - EpIk  I)Z  x,(e,  +  eo)  =  vZ  x,(e 1 +  eo)  = YO +  Y
1  =1  1 =1  I=1
N  N
where  Y=  V)  x e,  Y  = vL  x,e,,  correspond  to income  arising  from  the
1=1  1=1
contractual  and  non-contractual  provis  of  effort,  respectively;  p and  p 1
are  the  prices  of output  and  i-th  production  input,  respectively;  and  v =  pq -
EpikI  is  value  added  per  unit  of labor.
The  economy  Is  characterized  by the  following  distributive  Institutions:
(a)  Worker  earnings  are  determined  using  two  principles:  income  sharing 6 and
profit  sharing.  The  former  is  of the  "distribution  according  to  work"  type:
the  pre-redistribution  income  sharing  part  of the  personal  income  of the
r  r  =  xe7  PoisTr worker  with  productivity  xl,  yF,  is  defined  as y 1 =  vxIe  . Profits  I are
'The  use  of the  income  sharing  scheme  (as  well  as the  median  voter  framework
introduced  later)  follows  Meltzer  and  Richard's  (1983)  modeling  of the  size  of
government.
7The Income  sharing  scheme  fully  mirrors  the  persoral  earnings  formation  on
5deflned  as n - Y  - Y=  =  - Yn,  where  yn  =  yn  - Y ,  and  Vn is  an
0  nc  O0  0
externally  given  parameter.  Assume  that  profits  are  distributed  equally. 9
The  pre-redistribution  personal  Income  of the  worker  with  productivity
xi,  yp,  is  thus  equal  to
p  1  1  n yP  =vxe  +  =vxIe  +  N(Y  - YO)  (1)
(b)  There  is redistribution  within  the  firm  through  which  more  produ-.ive
workers  subsidize  less  productive  ones (equivalently,  there  Is  a
compression  of personal  earnings  differentials  within  the  firm). 10 T
the  basis  of the  so-called  live  labor  contribution  as practiced  In  Yugoslav
firms:  xi  corresponds  to the  index  of "complexity  of  work"  (largely
predetermined);  eI  to the  index  of  quality  of  work (determined  discretionary),
and  v to the (planned)  value  added  per  unit  of labor  (see  Schrenk,  1981).
8A firm's  norm  for  profits,  Yn,  is  based  on economy-  or industry-wide
performance,  as prescribed  by law (see  Schrenk,  1981,  or,  for  the  discussion
of a more  recent  regu!ation,  Vodopivec,  1989).
9This is  a simplification.  It,  nonetheless,  captures  some  of the  important
stylized  facts  of the  income  distribution  in the  Yugoslav  firm.  First,  equal
distribution  holds  for the  collective  consumption  fund,  and  second,  the
collective  consumption  fund  tends  to  be  more  closely  connected  with  profits
than  personal  Incomes  fund.
10There  is  a  well-documented  tendency  to  compress  wage  differentials  within  the
Yugoslav  firm.  Prasnikar  and  SveJnar  (1988,  p. 279),  for instance,  conclude
that  "fv]arious  measures  suggest  that  the  distribution  of personal  Income  Is
relatively  egalitarian  in  Yugoslav  firms"  and that  "Yugoslav  skilled  workers
6conceptualize  It in  the  following  way: the  income  sharing  part  of the
income  of each  worker  is "taxed"  at the  rate  t (0  < t  < 1) and  used  for
financing  an equal  per  capita  subsidy  r.  Net lntrafirm  redistribution  per
worker  Is thus  equal  to r  - tvxIeC imposing  a "balanced  budget",  Nr
Y
tvEx  e  or r =  ty,  y =  NC.  (One  can  justify  such  a conceptualization  on
the  grounds  that it  captures  two  basic  features  of real-world  intra'irm
redistribution:  (i)  it  represents  a redistribution  from  richer  to  poorer
and (ii)  it  preserves  the  ordering  of  personal  earnings,  thereby
compressing  the  structure  of personal  earning').
(c)  There  is  also  redistribution  among  firms,  amounting  to  taxing  profitable
firms  in  order  to  subsidize  unprofitable  ones  - a "soft-budget-constraint-
redistribution".  Let  net  subsidy  - total  subsidies  minus  total  taxes  - of
a firm (NSUBS)  be a linear  function  of  profits
NSUBS  = C +  sT,  C >  0, -1 < s <  0  (2)
where  C Is  a constant  and (-  s) is  a subsidy  rate.
Accordingly,  a  worker  with  productivity  x  receives  actual  income
v  equal  to
y, =  yP +  r - tvx  e  +  -(C  +  sH) =  r +  c +  (1  - t)vx e  +  -(1  +  s)T1  (3)
and  managers  earn less  relative  to  unskilled  workers  than  their  counterparts
in  capitalist  firms".
H  On the  state  paternalism  causing  such  a redistribution,  as well  as on the
general  channels  of such  redistribution,  see,  e.g.,  Kornai  (1980).  The
discussion  of Yugoslav  specificities  is  given  in  VodoFivec  (1989).
7where  c - gC  Subsequent.y,  v Is  normalized  to 3qual  1.
Equilibrium  level  of  work effort
Each  worker  takes  the  parameter-  r, t,  s, c,  and  Yf  as  given  and  chooses
eIto maximize  his  utility.  To render  the  model  empirically  testable,  a
specific  form  for  the  utility  function  (Stone-Geary)  is  assumed
u(y, A) =  In (y  +  w) + a ln(A + A);  a, w,  A  >  0  (4)
where  A is leisure  of a  worker.  Furthermore,  a  decisive  worker  (voter)  chooses
the  tax  rate  t to  maximize  his  utility,  taking  Into  account  the  responses  of
other  workers  to the  changes  in the  tax  rate  as summarized  in their  supply  of
effort  functions.
To solve  the  model,  let  us first  obtain  the  supply  of effort  functions  of
individual  workers.  Maximizing  (4),  taking  into  account  the  budget  constraint
(3)  and defining A =  1 - e, yields
max  u(yI 1 - ez)  =  max[In(w  +  r +  c  +  (1  - t)x  e  +
{e 1
N
I(1 +  s)(  xe  _ yn)) +  a  ln(i - e  +  A)]
J=1
Differentiating  the  above  equation  and  denoting  s'  =  -(1  +  s),  we get N
X(1  - t)  +  s'x + z  xXAi-)
1  a
w +  r  +  c  +  (1 - t)xIe  +  S'11  1 - e  + A =  LN  8e
Rearranging,  denoting  the  "conjectural  variation",  Z  xi8J,  with  hI
j*1
(I  +  A)  I(I  - t  s')x +  s'h]  [(1  - t)x,  +  sWx]ae-
- [(1  - t +  s')x[  +  s'h)]e  - +  r +  c +  s'  xeJ  - ) ]a '0
J*i
N
and  finally,  denoting  xJeJ  - Y'  with  IT,,
(1  + A)[(1 - t +  s')x  +  3'  - (w # r  +  c +  s'TT )a
e,  =  (a  +  1)(1  - t +  s')x +  s'h  for  x >  x0  (S)
e =  0 for  x s  x 1  ~~~~0
(w  +  r +  c +  s'TT)a  - O  +  A)s'n
where  x  =  (A  +  1)(1  - t  +  s')  (6)
x0 being  the  productivity  of the  most  productive  worker  among  those  who  opt
not to  provide  any  effort  over  and  above  the  minimum  e  , and  ho  the
conjectural  variation  of that  worker  (note  that  for  him gI = nI).  Let this
worker  be the  I  -th  one  as ranked  by  productivity.  Note  that  the  equilibrium
provision  of effort  of  worker  I,  e  ,  depends  - through  the In  term  - on the
equilibrium  provision  of effort  of  other  workers  (those  with  productivity
greater  than  x ).  To assure  a compatible  solution,  then,  one  must  assume  that
workers  have  consistent  expectations,  i.e.,  that  all  of them  correctly
anticipate  the  true  equilibrium  level  of profits  of a firm.  To assure
non-negativity  of x 0, let  us impose
9(w & r + c + s'T)a  >  (1  + A)s'h  , for  all i  (7)
(since 0 <  t <  1 and s' >  0 by assumption, the expression 1 - t +  s' is
positive).
On the  basis  of the  supply  of effort  functions  (5),  one  can  obtain  the
following  comparative  statics  result: 12
Proposition  1:  A higher  degree  of  expected  cooperation  among  workers  - as
reflected  in  the  increase  of the  conjectural  variation  term  h - gives  rise  to
a higher  equilibrium  work  effort  of all  workers  (ceteris  paribus).
The  intuition  is  clear--a  higher  expected  degree  of cooperation  increases
the  value  marginal  product  of effort  and  thus  induces  a higher  supply  of
effort.  In  order  to render  the  proposition  to  empirical  testability,  let  us
postulate  that  the  conjectural  variation,  h,  depends  on (i)  the  quality  of
self-management  and (ii)  number  of  workers,  i.e.,  h =  h(S,N).  4 Together  with
this  relationship,  Proposition  1  says  that  the  better  the  quality  of worker
self  management  and (or,  the  smaller  the  number  of workers  in  the  firm,  the
12Proofs  of this,  as well  as of the  four  propositions  stated  below,  are  given
in  Appendix  1.
13Note  that  this  is  a partial  equilibrium  result,  general  equilibrium  one  being
analytically  non-tractable.  In  other  words,  the  direct  effects  of the  change
in the  expected  degree  of cooperaLion  on the  provision  of  work  effort  are
taken  into  account,  but  not  the  indirect  ones (those  resulting  from  the
ensuing  changes  in firm  profitability  and redistribution  subsidy).  It  is thus
assumed--and  empirically  shown  below--that  the  latter  effects  are  negligible.
14One  may justify  these  assumptions  along  the  lines  of Tyson's  (1979)  coalition
formation  argument.  For  details,  see  Vodopivec,  1989.
10higher  the  equilibrium  effort  of  each  worker,  and  consequently,  the  overall
output.  These  are  empirically  testable  hypotheses  and  will  be tested  in  the
empirical  analysis  below  (self-management  being  represented  with  suitable
proxies).
As is  obvious  from  the  structure  of the  model,  Proposition  1 rests  on the
assumption  of profit  sharing.  In  other  words,  if  profit  sharing  Is  not in
place,  the  expected  reactions  of co-workers  to  the  change  of effort  of one  of
the  workers  does  not  matter.  This  result  provides  a formal  theoretical
underpinning  of the  Cable  and  FitzRoy  (1980)  claim  that  there  exist  powerful
Interactions  between  profit  sharing  and  participation  of workers  in  decision
making  in  determining  labor  productivity.
Productivity  effects  of interfirm  redistribution
The  model  also  yields  the  following  two  propositions  regarding  the
interfirm  redistribution:
Proposition  2: The  higher  the  amount  of net  subsidies  received  by the
firm  regardless  its  performance  (i.e.,  the  higher  c),  the  lower  its  output.
Proposition  3:  The lower  the  subsidy  rate  of the  firm,  the  bigger,
generally,  the  output.
Proposition  2 is  driven  purely  by the  income  effect.  At a higher  level  of
non-labor  income  brought  about  by the  increase  in  the  non-conditional  external
gift (represented  in the  model  by the  parameter  c) the  marginal  rate  of
substitution  between  leisure  and  effort  matches  with  the  value  marginal
product  of effort  at  a lower  level  of effort  supplied.  Note that  this  is  a
i 5Note  that  the  subsidy  rate  is  defined  as the  negative  of s, -1 > s  > 0, and
is  thus  positive.
11general  equilibrium  result.  The  proposition,  of  course,  provides  a nice
testable  implication  for the  empirical  analysis.
Proposition  3,  on the  other  hand,  deals  with  productivity  effects  arising
from  changes  in  the  subsidy  rate (-  s).  To  understand  the  ambiguity  of
predicted  effects,  one  should  note  that  increases  (decreases)  in  a subsidy
rate  are, in  fact,  equivalent  to  decreases  (increases)  in  the  product  price  of
the  firm,  and thus  both  substitution  and income  effect  are  present.  The
ambiguity  comes  from  the  fact  that  these  two  effects  may  work  in  opposite
directions.
Regarding  income  and  substitution  effect,  there  is  an Interesting
asymmetry  between  the  profitable  and loss-making  firms.  For the  former,  e.g.,
a reduction  of a subsidy  rate  has  a  positive  substitution  effect,  but  a
negative  income  effect  (since  less  income  is taken  away  from  them).  For
sufficiently  profitable  firms,  then,  the  combined  effect  is  negative.  On the
other  hand,  for  loss-makers  both  effects  work in  the  same  direction  (e.g.,  a
reduction  of subsidy  rate  has  a positive  substitution  and income  effect;  the
latter  because  less  income  is transferred  into  the  firm).  Since  one  cannot
unambiguously  sign  the  effects  of changes  in  a subsidy  rate,  it is left  to the
empirical  analysis  to  determine  which  effect  actually  dominates.
A comment  on the  nature  of redistribution  flows  that  generate  negative
productivity  effects,  which  is  misinterpreted  in the  literature,  is  in  order.
Kornai  (1986a)  correctly  asserts  that  positive  effects  of  profit  sharing  are
lessened  when firms  face  soft  budget  constraint.  However,  he inappropriately
attributes  the  dampening  effect  of such  redistribution  to its  randomness.  He
says  "(t)he  frequent  unforeseeable  and incalculable  redistribution  flowing
through a hundred channels makes profit incentive illusory ...  "  (p. 129).  As
follows  from  the  last  two  propositions,  however,  it is  precisely  the
12systematic  nature  of the  Interfirm  redistribution  which  has (or  may  have)
negative  effects  on labor  effort  in  a profit-sharing  environment.
Productivity  effects  of intrafirm  redistribution
The  modeling  of lntrafirm  redistribution  as  a particular  tax-subsidy
scheme  (defined  earlier  in this  section)  reduces  typically  multi-dimensional
Issue  of redistribution  to  only  two  dimensions--per-capita  subsidy  (r)  and
lntrafirm  tax  rate (t).  By requiring  that  the  budget  be  balanced,  only  cne  of
them,  in  fact,  can  be Independently  determined  (the  tax  rate  t is the  choice
variable  below).
In  order  to  proceed  with  modeling,  one  has to take  into  account  the
following  two  characteristics  of the  Yugoslav  firm:  (i)  the  structure  of
personal  earnings  within  the  firm  is largely  determined  by the  so-called  scale
of complexity  of work  positions,  and (ii)  that  this  scale  is  accepted  by the
referendum  of all  workers  based  on a simple  majority  rule.  16  These  two
characteristics  of the  decision-making,  together  with the  treatment  of
redistribution  as a single  dimensional  issue,  enable  invoking  a median  voter
theorem 17 which  says  that  the  preference  of the  median  voter  decides.
Inserting  r =  t and  yd  =  xded  for  the income  of the  decisive  voter
16For  details,  see  Vodopivec  (1989).
17For  a  discussion  of the  median  voter  theorem,  see,  e.g.,  Mueller  (1979).
18The  subsequent  analysis  only  make  sense  If the  personal  income  of the  median
worker  Is lower  than  average.  Only in that  case,  namely,  he imposes
redistribution  "from  richer  to  poorer";  otherwise,  the  optimal  tax  rate  is
evidently  zero.  Since  normally  personal  income  distribution  is  skewed  to the
right,  this  condition  is likely  to  be fulfilled.
13(subscript  d standing  for  a decisive  voter)  into  the  utility  function  (3),  we
have
max u(yd 1 - ed)  =
maxIn  w * ty + c + (1 - t)y  + 1(1 + s)(Ny  -y))  +  a ln(  - e  + A)]
and  the  first  order  condition  is
y +  (t +  (1 +  s))  -t  Yd =  0  (8)
de
since  - by the  envelope  theorem  - the  coefficient  of the  dt  term,  is,  is
d
zero (e being  the  outcome  of the  utility  maximization).
To solve  equation  (8)  for  t, the  total  derivative  of (non-contractual)
output  with respect  to  the  tax  rate  must  be  expressed  in terms  of coefficients
and  predetermined  variables.  As shown  in  Appendix  1,  the  following  holds:
Proposition  4: An increase  of the  lntrafirm  tax  rate  t  has  a negative
effect  on the  output  of the  firm.
Unfortunately,  this  intuitively  appealing  result  does  not  render  itself
to  empirical  verifiability,  since  the  intrafirm  tax  rate  t is  unobservable.  By
employing  the  equilibrium  condition  (8),  however,  one  can  derive  a functional
relationship  between  the  unobservable  tax  rate  t  and  an observable  variable.
Equation  (8),  namely,  embodies  the  following  fundamental  trade-off  faced  by
the  median  voter:  by imposing  a higher  tax  rate,  he Is  better  off  through  the
higher  subsidy  r (which  is  proportional  to  t).  However,  there  is  also  an
indirect  effect  of the  increase  of  the  "tax  rate"  (the  decrease  of the  size  of
the  overall  pie,  as stated  In  Proposition  4)  which  makes  the  decisive  voter
worse off.
14As shown  in  Appendix  1, the  equation  determining  the  equilibrium
intrafirm  tax  rate is  non-linear  and  cannot  be solved  analytically.  It is,
however,  possible  to show  that,  under  economically  meaningful  conditions,  the
following  holds:
Proposition  5:  The  higher  the  mean  as compared  to the  median  personal
Income  of the  firm,  the  higher  is the  lntrafirm  tax  rate  t.
The Intuition  behind  this  result  is the  following.  The intrafirm
tax-subsidy  scheme  adopted  in the  model  is  such  that  the  structure  of  after
tax-subsidy  personal  earnings  corresponds  to the  structure  of pre-tax-subsidy
earnings,  and thus  also  reflects  the  structure  of  productivity  among  workers.
Therefore,  the  proposition  can  be interpreted  as saying  that  the lower  the
productivity  of the  median  worker  (ranked  by productivity)  as compared  to the
productivity  of the  worker  with the  mean Income,  the  more the  median  worker
can  gain  by imposing  a higher  tax  rate  (or,  loosely  speaking,  a higher
intrafirm  redistribution  of income).
Combining  propositions  4 and  5, one  thus  obtains  the  following
testable  implication:
Corollary  1:  The  higher  the  mean  as compared  to the  median  personal
income  of the  firm,  the  lower  the  output  of the  firm.
Let  me conclude  this  subsection  by  discussing  policy  instruments
available  to the  decisive  voter  to implement  the  redistribution.  As mentioned,
workers  determine  the  scale  of complexity  of  work  positions  of the  firm
by referendum.  This  scale,  together  with  overall  amount  of Income  earmarked
for  personal  earnings,  largely  determines  personal  earnings  received  by the
workers.  Having  the  optimal  intrafirm  tax  rate  in  mind,  the  median--decisive--
worker  sets  the  scale  of complexity  of work  positions  in  such  a fashion  that
it  produces  precisely  the  redistribution  that  is  optimal  from  his  point  of
15view.  By shrinking  the  index  of complexity  of individual  work  position
(I  COMP  )--as  established  through  the  scale  of complexity  of labor  positions  of
the  firm--for  all the  workers  whose  non-contractual  contribution  of effort  is
above  the  average,  ad  Increasing  it  for  all  the  workers  below  the  ave-age  (as
compared  with the  distribution  of personal  incomes  in the  absence  of intrafirm
redistribution),  the  decisive  worker  ensures  the  distribution  of the  Income
sharing  portion  of personal  incomes  D  =  {eIx 1 +  (y  - xIeI)t  E e1xIy I  =  l,
1  ~~~COKP COMP
N), instead of D =  {e 1x1, I  =  1,  ... ,  N). 9 Formally, I  =I
where  the  hat indicates  the  modification  of the  variable  by the  redistribution
as imposed  by the  decisive  voter.
3.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
3.1  The  estimating  framework
According  to the  theoretical  model,  the  provision  of equilibrium  effort
of individual  workers  (and  of the  firm  as a  whole)  depends  on motivational
factors  (notably  the  degree  of intra-  and interfirm  redistribution,  and  the
conduciveness  of environment  for  cooperation).  That  provision  may  be labelled
as "effectively  provided  labor",  as opposed  to  a conventional  labor  input
measured  by the  physical  presence  of  workers  (e.g.,  by number  of workers  or
work  hours).  Let  us define  effectively  provided  labor  (L)  of the  firm
consisting  of N workers  as  L =  Ne,  where  e, the  average  effectively  provided
labor  of the  firm,  is  the  following  function:
(y  - xIe  )t
19The  suppression  coefficients,  o  i-s,  are  defined  as c=I  +  e  x
l =  1, ... ,  N (note  that c  < 1  as  xe)
16e =  e(h, c, s', m)  (9)
The  explanation  and  the  theoretical  underpinning  of the  arguments  of the  e
function  are  given  in the  previous  section  (predictions  of the  expected  signs
of the  derivatives  of the  e function  with  respect  to its  arguments  are
provided  by Propositions  1-3  and  Corollary  1,  respectively).
In  trying  to  estimate  equation  (9),  one is,  of course,  confronted  wlth  a
fundamental  problem  of non-observability  of the  dependent  variable,  the
effectively  provided  labor.  Fortunately,  a solution  for  this  problem  is
readily  at hand:  one  can identify  the  effects  of the  structural  variables  of
interest  not  on the  effectively  provided  labor  itself,  but  on its  results.  One
can  thus  employ  a production  function  analysis,  with  effectively  provided
labor  substituting  for  the  conventional  labor  Input.  Since  the  analysis
focuses  on the  identification  of structural  factors  determining  effectively
provided  labor,  only  simple  production  functions  of the  Cobb-Douglas  type  are
used.
The  production  function  estimating  framework,  however,  requires  the
re-introduction  of some  of the  complexities  of the  real  world  which  are,  for
the  sake  of analytical  convenience,  assumed  away In  the  theoretical  model.  In
the  empirical  analysis  I thus  distinguish  different  levels  of skills  of
workers  typically  found  across  industries;  this  Is  accomplished  by treating
education  as a separate  production  factor.  Furthermore,  by controlling  for
capital  stock,  I  allow  for  differences  in technology  among  firms.  20
20This  Implies  substitutability  between  capital  and labor,  while  fixed
proportion  technology  is  assumed  in  the  theory.  Since  the  assumption  of fixed
proportions  Is  relatively  unimportant  in  the  theoretical  model,  the  validity
17Consequently, the following form of the production function is used as a basic
vehicle of the empirical analysis:
INC =  tKaLOE7eu  (10)
where A is a constant; INC - income of the firm ;  K - value of fixed assets in
use; L =  Ne(h, c, s', m) - effectively provided labor  as just  defined; E -
average duration of professional education of workers; a, 3,  and  '  - the
elasticities of income  with respect to K, L, and E, respectively; and e  - a
random variable (in the exponential form).
While the theory gives a guidance on which incentive factors to include
in (9)  and, consequently, in (10), it is silent about its functional form. On
the experimental basis, the following functional form for the effectively
provided labor  was selected:  2 1
L =  N(l + a  h + a  2c  +  a3s' +  a  m)  (11)
yielding the following estimable form of (10):
INC = AK  N(  1 + ah  + ac+as'  + a  m)$ Eleu  (10')
1  2  3  4 
of its predictions is  most likely  unaffected.
2 1Note that the selected functional form assumes interaction  between firm size
and motivational factors (an  alternative specification is also tested below),
and that the form does not allow for the possible negative productivity
effects of the firm size arising from reduced chances for cooperation In
larger firms.
18Equation  (10')  Is  a form  of  an augmented  production  function  and  thus
resembles  the  ones  used  extensively  in  the  literature  on testing  for  the
productivity  effects  of worker  participation.  It  is,  however,  distinguished  by
two  important  features:  (l)  it is  based  or,  a tightly  specified  theoretical
model,  and (iI)  as  dictated  by the  theory,  motivational  (structural)  factors
enter  Into (10')  in  a specific,  distinctly  labor-interacting  manner.
Equation  (10')  provides  ammunition  for  the  criticism  of the  existing
empirical  literature  on productivity  effects  of  worker  participation.  The
presence  of  h (conduciveness  of environment  for  cooperation)  in (10')  gives  a
theoretical  underpinning  for  the  Inclusion  of  proxies  for  decision-making  and
possibly  ownership  in  empirical  tests  in  the  literature.  In  light  of (10'),
however,  profit-sharing  is  often  completely  misrepresented.  Namely,  Instead  of
using  a level  of profit  per  worker,  one  should  use,  as the  presence  of the  s'
term  in (10')  suggests,  a profit  sharing  rate  as the  explanatory  variable
representing ie  effects  of profit-sharing.  Indeed,  based  on (10'),  the  level
of  profits  per  worker  has  no place  among  variables  explaining  productivity
effects  of profit  sharing.  In  fact,  being  of residual  nature  and  thus
reflecting  many  factors  which  may  have  nothing  to  do  with  worker  actions
(e.g., monopoly  rents,  first  mover  advantages,  -tc.),  one  may  expect  the  sign
of the  level  of shared  profits  on the  right  hand side  of (10')  to  be even
negative  - functioning,  namely,  in the  same  role  as c in (10').
Except  m, the  ratio  of mean  to  median  personal  earnings  of the  firm,  all
22Estrin  et al (1987),  for instance,  use  a variable  BONUS,  defined  as average
surplus  distributed  per  worker,  as one  of the  "structural"  variables
augmenting  the  production  function.
19other  variables  in (11)  need  a comment  on their  derivation  or empirical
representation.  Let  me start  with  the  selection  of the  appropriate  variable
for  the  conjectural  variation  term,  h, representing  the  conduciveness  of the
environment  for  cooperation  ("team  spirit",  or,  even  broader,  quality  of
self-management,  control  by  vcice).  Based  on empirical  availability,  the
following  variables  are  considered  as  possible  candidates:  labor  turnover
(TURN),  the  percentage  of  payments  for  sick  leaves  in total  hours  paid  by the
firm (SICK),  and the  percentage  of personal  earnings  paid  as a reward  to
individuals  for  rationalizations  and innovations  (CREATE).
The  expected  sign  of the  first  two  variables,  SICK  and  TURN,  is  nega).ive.
The less  conducive  environment  is  for  cooperation  (the  worse  the  discipline,
as primarily  reflected  in  the  SICK  variable,  and  the  more  disturbed  the
working  relations  are,  as  one can  understand  from  the 1URN  variable),  the
lower  the  output.  The  turnover  variable,  in  addition,  captures  also  the  "asset
specificity"  effects  (which  work in  the  same  direction  as the  effect  based  on
the  cooperation  argument).  The longer  the  workers  stay  in the  firm,  the  more
firm  specific  knowledge  they  acquire,  and  - other  things  equal  - the  more
productive  they  are.
Reflecting  payments  received  by individuals  for  their  notable
contributions  in improving  the  production  process  of the  firm,  CREATE  can  be
interpreted  as an indicator  of organized  efforts  to  stimulate  individual
creativity,  which  can, in  turn,  be associated  with  a  generally  conducive  work
environment  (high  team  spirit).  Alternatively,  it  may  represent  a very large
increase  of the  "price  of the  product"  (in  this  case,  only  of the  worker
receiving  the  innovation  reward)  which  induces  the  increase  of output  (one  can
expect  that  the  substitution  effect  dominates  the  income  effect  in this  case).
In  either  case,  its  expected  sign  is  positive.
20One  should  note  that  the  interpretation  of the  motivational  proxies  SICK,
TURN,  and  CREATE  adopted  here (representing  the  conduciveness  of the
environment  for  cooperation)  is  not  the  only  possible  one  yielding  the
productivity  effects  as just  described.  The  alternative  interpretations  for
TURN (asset  specificity  argument)  and  CREATE  (the  increase  of "the  price  of
the  product"  argument)  were  already  given. SICK,  also,  can  be alternatively
interpreted  as representing  better  allocative  efficiency  in the  sense  of  more
intense  Internal  policing  via stricter  supervising.
Fortunately,  it Is  possible  to  design  an empirical  test  to  determine
which  Interpretation  of the  motivational  factors  TURN,  SICK,  and  CREATE
Included  in (11)  is  more  appropriate.  Namely,  if  the  cooperation  argument
holds,  then  the  effect  of these  variables  Is  related  to the  size  of the  firm
and  the  above  variables  should  enter  (11)  in  an interactive  fashion  with the
size  of the  firm (represented  by number  of  workers,  N).  This implies  that
holding  labor  turnover,  sick  leave,  and innovation  reward  rate  constant,  the
larger  the  firm,  the  more  negative  the  effect  of TURN  and  SICK,  and  the  less
positive  the  effect  of the  innovation  reward  rate  on output.  If,  however,  the
alternative  interpretation  Is  correct,  there  are  no interactions  between  these
motivational  factors  and  firm  size.  Consequently,  one  can  determine  which
specification  is  correct  by comparing  the  empirical  results  obtained  from
alternative  specifications  (judging,  above  all,  by the  sign  and  significance
of the  estimates  in  question).
Another  possible  criticism  of the  interpretation  of the  proxies  for  the
conduciveness  of the  environment  for  cooperation  should  be addressed.  One may
object  to  linking  these  variables  to the  quality  of self-management,  by simply
arguing  that  TURN,  SICK,  and  CREATE  have  nothing  to do  with it,  since  they
could  play  the  same  role  also in  capitalist  economies.  However,  if  one  takes
21Into  account  the  tradition  of self-management  in  Yugoslavia,  as  well  as that
there  exists  a  well  established  formal  network  Involving  workers  in the
decision  making  of the  Yugoslav  firm,  one  realizes  that  labor  tuinover,  sick
leaves,  and  rewarding  workers  for improvements  of the  production  process  are
necessarily  influenced,  among  other  things,  by the  extent  of  worker
participation  in  firm  decision  making  (or  "quality  of self-management").
Finally,  c and  s',  the  constant  component  of the  interfirm  transfers  per
worker  and the  profit  sharing  rate  of  an individual  worker  respectively,  are
computed  as the  parameters  of the  interfirm  transfer  function  (2),  estimated
by industry.  23  With  a few  exceptions,  the  fit  of estimated  equation  (OLS  method
is used)  Is  very  good,  especially  for  cross-section  data.  The  subsidy  rate
(-s)  falls  in the  theoretically  permissible  range  (0,1)  in  all  but  two  cases
(out  of 19 industries),  and  is  normally  highly  significant.  Less  significant,
in  general,  Is the  constant  term,  ranging  from  positive  to  negative  values
23Defining  profits  as the  difference  between  actual  income  (INC)  and the
exogenously  determined  norm  for  income  (INC,  proxied  by the  industry  average
of the  income  per  worker  multiplied  by the  number  of workers  of the  firm)  and
using  this  definition  in  the  interfirm  transfer  function  (2),  the  following
estimable  function  is  obtained:  NSUBS  =  CONST  +  s*INC,  where  CONST  is  a
constant  and (-s)  is  a subsidy  rate,  from  which  the  variables  s'  and c  are
1  +  s  CONST  +  s*INC
computed as s' =  N  and c =  N  Note that the above method of
calculating  s' implies  that its  value  is  the  same  for  all  firms  within  the
industry  (one  can  justify  that  by the  similarity  of rules  and  practices
determining  the  softness  of the  budget  constraint  faced  by individual  firms,
especially  in regard  to  crediting  (e.g.,  some  industries  are  given  priority  by
social  plans  and  are  so entitled  to  concessionary  financing).
22(detailed  results  are  presented  In  Vodopivec,  1989)  2"
3.2  The  results
On the  basis  of (10')  and  the  discussion  of proxies  used  for  the
conjectural  variation  term,  h, the  following  augmented  production  function  was
estimated  (in  logarithmic  transformation):
INC  =  AK"(N(1  +  a,m  + a  c + a  s' + a  TURN  +  a.SICK  +  a  CREATE))$EW  (12)
The  estimation  results,  with  alternative  combinations  of proxies
for  the  h term,  are  presented  in  Table  1.25  The  fit  Is  very  good  and  meaningful
values  are  obtained  for the  usual  parameters  Included  In  production
functions.  26 Furthermore  and  of central  importance,  all  of the  estimated
24The  estimated  negative  value  for  c, the  constant  component  of the  interfirm
transfers  per  worker,  is theoretically  acceptable,  but it  does  weaken  some  of
the  predictions  of the  theoretical  model;  empirical  results  that  would
contradict  some  of the  predictions  of the  model  could,  therefore,  be
attributed  to  the  negativity  of c.
25Definitions  of the  variables  used in  the  analysis  and the  description  of the
data  base  are  given  in  Appendix  2.
26The  estimates  of elasticities  suggest  that  the  economy  operates  at
approximately  constant  returns  to  scale  (the  sum  of capital  and  effectively
provided  labor  elasticities  ranges  from  .997  In  model  (2)  to 1.034  in  model
(4)).  A bit  surprising  Is  a high  estimate  for  the  elasticity  of educatlon,
ranging  from 1.75  to  2.879.
23TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF THE AUGMENTED PRODUCTION FUNCTION
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
11  *  t  *
m  -.451  -.493  -.438  -.304
(-2.69)  (-2.92)  (-3.56)  (-0.92)
-2  0  0 10  2c  -.827  -.926  -.907
(-2.37)  (-2.06)  _  (-1.88)
st  4.726  4.658  - 4.510
(.50)  (.57)  (.48)
1  ~~  ~~*  0f
10o  *TURN  -.135  -.150  -.075  -.169
(-2.09)  (-2.11)  (-1.82)  (-1.73)
10o  *SICK  -.125  - -.240  -.227
(-.68)  (-2.39)  (-.86)
CREATE  .296  .287  .266  .473
(1.57)  (1.35)  (1.85)  (1.41)
00  0*~'*41  so
K  .293  .30Ls  .305  .317
(7.96)  (8.12)  (8.68)  (7.67)
00  0*  10  00
L  .722  .704  .724  .717
(7.54)  (8.12)  (16.43)  (6.84)
10  *0  *0  *0
E  1.949  1.978  2.879  1.750
(3.70)  (3.62)  (5.65)  (2.99)
INTEE.CEPT  -1.446  -1.450  -3.520  -1.320
(-1.11)  (-1.18)  (-2.92)  (-0.90)
R2 .815  .801  .807  .813
Observations  403  403  403  323
Notes:  Among  the  variables  in the  first  column  appears  also  L, effective.y
provided  labor  (the  expression  in  the  big  parentheses  of (12)),  with l  as the
corresponding  coefficient.  The  values  in  parentheses  are t-statistics.
Variables significant at 1% are marked with two asterisks (00),  and those
slgnificant  at 5% with  one  asterisk  (0).  Model  (4)  is  based  on the  restricted
sample  (only  observations  with  m 2  1  were  used).
24parameters  of the  motivational  variables  (modifiers  of the  conventionally
defined  labor  input)  are  of the  expected  sign  and  mostly  significant.  This
provides  empirical  confirmation  for  the  relevance  of the  three  groups  of
motivational  factors  (intrafirm  and interfirm  redistribution,  cooperation
among  workers)  as  determinants  of productivity  of the  Yugoslav  firm.
The  variable  representing  intrafirm  redistribution,  m (the  ratio  of mean
to  median  personal  earning  of the  firm),  Is  found  to  have  a signifizantly
negative  influence  on the  gross  income  (in  model (4)  the  estimate  loses
significance,  but retains  a negative  value).  To repeat,  m functions  as  an
Indicator  of the  intrafirm  redistribution  (more  precisely,  of the  intrafirm
tax  rate  t),  so the  higher  the  m, the  more redistribution  Is taking  place  (the
higher  the  tax  rate),  and,  consequently,  the  lower  the  output.  It  is
interesting  that  m gains  significance  when the  sample  Is  not  restricted  to
only  the  observations  which  have  mean  personal  income  higher  than  the  median,  27
thus  providing  additional  evidence  that  the  firms  with  no intrafirm
redistribution  perform  better  than  the  ones  where  the  "median  voter"  imposes
redistribution  (i.e.,  compresses  the  differentials  in  personal  earnings). 28
27Note that  in  great  majority  of enterprises  (80.1%  of them),  the  mean  personal
income  is indeed  larger  than  the  median,  as the  theory  above  assumes.
28To be ahle to  run  the  model  on the  extended  sample,  strictly  speaking,  the
influence  of m on the  gross  income  should  be represented  by a kinked  function,
flat  for  m s 1.  With the  mean  personal  income  being  equal  or below  the  median,
namely,  the  intrafirm  redistribution  disappears,  and  so does its  effect  on
output.  Since  m enters  into  (12)  via  a logarithmic  function  and  Is  negatively
signed,  the  decrease  of of the  importance  of the  values  of m s  1 is,  to  some
extent,  accomplished  simply  by the  nature  of the  logarithmic  function.
25Both interfirm  redistribution  parameters,  c  and  s',  confirm  the  negative
effects  of lnterfirm  redistribution  on productivity.  As described  above,  the
negativity  of the  c term,  the  constant  component  of the  interfirm  transfers
per  worker,  shows  that  the  firms  with  higher  non-conditional  gifts (lower
dues)  generate  systematically  less  output  than  those  with  lower  non-
conditional  gifts  (higher  dues).  The  sign  of the  other  interfirm  parameter,  s'
(the  profit  sharing  rate  of the  individual  worker)  is theoretically  ambiguous,
reflecting  the  presence  of both  substitution  and  income  effects  (the  latter
may,  in  some  cases,  work in the  opposite  direction  as the  former).  Possibly  as
the  result  of these  conflicting  tendencies,  the  estimated  coefficient  of s' Is
not  significant.  Its  positiveness,  nonetheless,  provides  some  support  to the
hypothesis  that  negative  effects  of interfirm  redistribution  arise  because  the
profit  sharing  rate  of the  individual  worker  is lowered  causing  negative
substitution  effects  that  are larger  than  the  ensuing  positive  income  effects.
Lastly,  the  empirical  results  also  provide  support  for  our  choice  of
proxies  for  motivational  factors  here interpreted  as representing  the
conduciveness  of the  environment  for  cooperation  ("team  spirit").
Statistically  the  most  significant  among  them  is  labor  turnover  (TURN);  SICK
and  CREATE,  while  being  correctly  signed,  are  statistically  insignificant
(except  SICK in  model  (3)).  Note  that  they  all  enter (12)  in  a fashion  that
assumes  the  interaction  with  the  number  of workers  N, the  specification  that
produced  better  empirical  results.  The  empirical  results  thus  show  that  the
29The  following  equation  was  also  estimated:
1  2  3  6~  E
INC  =AK' (N(1  + alm  +  a  c +  a3s')  +  aTURN  +  a5IK+  aCREATE)E
Note that  TURN,  SICK  and  CREATE  enter  in  a fashion  that  does  not  assume  an
26appropriate  interpretation  of the  above  motivational  factors  is  the  one  based
on the  cooperation  argument:  the  better  the  relations  among  workers  (the  more
they  feel  that  they  can influence  the  working  environment,  as reflected  in  a
lower  turnover  and  sick leave  rate),  the  higher  the  output  (except  for  CREATE
which  reflects  both  cooperation  and individualistic  "price"  incentives).
To assess  the  Importance  of the  institutional  inefficiencies  discussed
above,  one  would  estimate  the  output  forgone  because  of these  inefficiencies.
The  empirical  estimates  of the  parameters  in (12)  enable  one to  do precisely
that.  That is,  one  can  perform  a simple  experiment  consisting  of inserting  a
modified  value  instead  of the  true  one  for  a chosen  exogenous  variable  (an
Instrument  under  consideration)  In (12)  and  observe  the  ensuing  difference  in
the  income,  the  dependent  variable.  The  results  of such  experiments  with the
parameters  of interfirm  and intrafirm  redistribution  are  reported  in  Table  2.30
The  ebtimated  loss  of income  due to  the  presence  of interfirm
redistribution  amounts  to  3.23%  (obtained  on the  basis  of  parameter  c),  to
which  one  may  add  .86  % income  loss  caused  by the  effects  of the  non-zero
interaction  with  N, number  of  workers  (because  the  effectively  provided  labor
is  raised  to a  power  of 9,  some  interaction,  when  1 *  1,  exists,  but it 5s  of
second  order  magnitude).  In  comparison  with  the  equation  where  the  interaction
is  assumed,  the  general  fit  was lower;  t-statistic  of TURN  was impaired  (but
the  sign  remained  the  same),  SICK reversed  the  sign (!)  but  was insignificant,
while  the  significance  and  sign  of  CREATE  remained  unchanged.
30Simulations  are  performed  at the  "sample  mean".  That  is,  the  value  of the
sample  mean Is  taken  for the  value  of the  corresponding  explanatory  variable
in (12),  except  for  K and  E, for  which  the  sample  means  for  log(K)  and log(E)
are  used.
27TABLE  2
INCOME  FORGONE  DUE  TO INSTITUTIONAL  INEFFICIENCIES
Instrument  Characterization  of the  change  Income  forgone
of the instrument  (in %)
c  Reduction  of c  by 7.3%  of the  3.23
average  income  of the  sample
so  s' =  1/N assumed (i.e.,  zero  .86
interfirm  transfer  rate,  s = 0)
m  m =  1 assumed (no intrafirm  2.70
transfers)
Notes:  Estimated  coefficients  are  taken  from  the  model (1)  of Table  1.  World
Bank (1989)  reports  a  net transfer  of income  amounting  to  7.3%  of  gross  social
product  from the  banking  to  enterprise  sector  in  Yugoslavia  in 1986,  so the
reduction  of c corresponds  to the  abolishment  of  net inflow  of resources  into
the  enterprise  sector.
transfer  rate (the  latter  estimate  could  only  be taken  provisionally,  since
the  coefficient  of s' In (12)  is  not  significant  and  hence  its  true  value  may
be considerably  different).  The  estimate  of the  output  forgone  because  of the
intrafirm  redistribution  (i.e.,  because  of the  compressed  intrafirm
differentials  in  personal  earnings)  is  2.70%.
The  magnitude  of these  numbers  is  neither  negligible  nor  spectacular.
Compared  with  estimates  of  welfare  loss  from  monopoly,  3  these  numbers  seem
31With  few  exceptions,  studies  on the  U.S.  economy,  including  the  pioneering
Harberger's  (1954)  one,  find  welfare  losses  attributable  to  monopoly  of  a
very  low  magnitude  (approximately  .1%  of  GNP).
28very  significant  and support  Leibenstein's  (1966)  claim  that  X-inefficiency
losses  are likely  to  be much  greater  than  losses  arising  from  monopoly.  The
estimates  of income  forgone  thus provide  evidence  that  the  redistribution
focused  on in  this  research  has  been  a  substantial  hindrance  to  the
development  of Yugoslavia,  and  most likely  also  to the  development  of other
socialist  countries  of Eastern  Europe.
Simllar  simulation  experiments  were  performed  also  with  TURN,  SICK,  and
CREATE  as instruments.  The results  are  as follows.  The  reduction  of the
average  labor  turnover  rate  from its  present  mean  value  to the  value  of the
present  first  quartile  (i.e.,  a reduction  from  2.50%  to .95%)  yields  a 2.58%
increase  of income,  and  a similar  reduction  of a sick  leave  rate (from  4.05%
to 3.03%)  a 1.58%  increase  of income.  These  results  show  that  the  realization
of  quite  achievab'e  targets  in improving  the  conduciveness  of the  environment
for  cooperation  - what these  two  variables,  as shown  above,  stand  for  - would
quite  substantially  increase  production.
Similarly,  the  simulation  with  CREATE  as an instrument  shows  significant
unexploited  productivity  reserves.  The  result  shows  that  if  all  firms  rewarded
their  workers  for their  exceptional  work  contributions  at the  average  rate  of
those  firms  that  actually  did,32  the  resulting  increase  of income  would  be
5.29%,  and,  furthermore,  the  income  generated  in  this  fashion  is  51 times
higher  than  the  reward  received  by workers.
32Since  such  a stimulation  may  not  be appropriate  for  some industries,  only
industries  where  this  method  was  actually  used  are  accounted  for.
294. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The  results  of the  empirical  analysis  show  that  Yugoslav  firms  suffer
important  output  losses  caused  by both intrafirm  and interfirm  redistribution
(the  same is  likely  to  be true  for  other  socialist  firms).  This  leaves  room
for  costless  efficiency  improvements  if  such  a redistribution  is  abolished.
A society  free  of any  redistribution  is,  by no means,  ideal.  It is  only
the  particular  types  of interfirm  and intrafirm  redistrilution  that  are  under
attack.  3  The  claim  that  the  soft-budget-constraint  economy  is  appealing  from
the  equity  point  of view (made,  e.g.,  by  Kornai,  1986b)  is  questionable.  The
economies  where  a huge  portion  of GNP is  redistributed  through  an informal
system  of  bargaining  are  bound  to  generate  not  only inefficiencies  in
production  (as  demonstrated  above),  but  also in  distribution--the  latter  ones
simply  because  of differences  in the  ability  of different  groups  to  represent
their  common  Interests  as Implied  by the  logic  of collective  action  (Olson,
1965).  5
The  increase  of wage  differentials  may indeed  be  neither  too
controversial  nor too  difficult  task  (an  important  step  in this  direction  is,
33Indeed,  together  with the  abolition  of the  above  discussed  redistribution,  a
society  should  establish  an alternative  "social  safety  net",  but  one  that
minimizes  the  efficiency  hampering  effects  (an  often  quoted  example  is
Sweden).
34For  the  evidence  on the  size  of lnterfirm  redistribution,  see  Konovalov
(1989)  for  Yugoslavia,  and  Saldanha  (1990)  and  Schaffer  (1990)  for  Poland.
35As  argued  by  Olson (1982),  "a  society  that  would  achieve  either  efficiency  or
equity  through  comprehensive  bargaining  is  out  of the  question"  (p.  37).
30e.g.,  the  Yugoslav  1989  legislation,  which  abolishes  the  referendum  that  had
previously  been  required  for  establishing  intrafirm  earnings  differentials).
Incomparably  more  complex  is  the  issue  of interfirm  transfers.  To prevent
them,  one should  (i)  stop  subsidizing  enterprises  (whether  from  government
or enterprise  sources),  (ii)  make the  fiscal  system  unselective  and
transparent  (in  particular,  apply  uniform  tax  rates,  unburden  enterprises  of
parafiscal  "financial  investments",  and  reduce  the  technical  complexity  of the
system  by reducing  the  variety  of taxes  paid  by enterprises),  and (iii)  impose
positive  interest  rates  (in  real  terms)  on  any  kind  of loans  (e.g.,  by
indexation  of debts).
On the  basis  of the  discussion  of the  confrontation  of coalitions  that
underlies  the  soft-budget-constraint  redistribution,  it  has  been  claimed
elsewhere  (Vodopivec,  1989)  that  socialist  countries  at  present  simply  lack
adequate  mechanisms  to  prevent  such  redistribution:  It is  the  ill-defined
property  rights,  together  with  the  absence  of competition  characterizing  both
political  and  economic  institutions  of these  societies,  which  generates  such  a
redistribution.  Uprooting  the  redistribution,  therefore,  calls  for  the
introduction  of a  new  mechanisms  that  would  (i)  provide  alternative  services
on the  basis  of impersonal  (market)  decision-making  and  thus  supplant
bargaining  between  interest  groups,  in the  areas  where  this  is feasible,  and
(ii)  supplement  current  institutions  by providing  checks  and  balances  in  the
political  decision-making  process,  in the  areas  where  impersonal  decision
making  is  not  possible  (e.g.,  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  etc).  The  Eastern
Europe  "peaceful  revolutions"  of the  second  half  of 1989  seem  to  have  removed
political  obstacles  for  the  introduction  of such  changes--but  their  actual
implementation  might  still  be a lengthy  and  painful  process.
To conclude,  a remark  on the  destiny  of the  worker  participation  in
31current  reforms  of socialist  countries,  particularly  relevant  for  Yugoslavia.
The  empirical  evidence  presented  above,  which  indicates  strong  productivity
potential  of factors  determining  the  conduciveness  to  an environment  of
cooperation,  Is In line  with the  results  of the  empirical  literature  on worker
participation  In  market  economies,  favoring  worker  participation  on
productivity  grounds  (recent  findings  are  summarized  in  Blinder,  1990).  The
current  trend  of the  dethronement  of  all  old institutions--which  takes  place,
as usual  In  socialist  countries,  In  a "great  leap"  style--thus  brings  a danger
of throwing  out the  baby  with the  bath  water:  while  many  of the  existing
institutions  indeed  deserve  a complete  demise,  this  is  not the  case  with  all
aspects  of  worker-management.  In  a radically  changed  overall  environment,
these  countries  may  well  find  worker  participation  to  be productivity
increasing,  as it is in  developed  market  economies.
APPENDIX  1:  PROOFS  OF THE  PROPOSITIONS
Proof  of Proposition  1
Taking  a partial  derivative  of (5)  with  respect  to  h 1, and  denoting  the
denominator  of (5)  with  D, one  obtains
6e
2  1
D  _h  =  [(w  + r + c + s'T)  + (1 + A)(1 - t + s')x ]as'
The last  expression  is  positive,  since  (i)  a, s' and (1  +  A) are  positive
by definition,  (ll)  the  term  (1  - t  +  s') is  positive  because  of the  nature  of
the  problem  Cs'  =  N  is  positive,  and it  is  economically  meaningful  to
36Equations  of the  main  text  are  referred  to  with  the  same  numbers  as they  were
given  in the  text;  the  equations  derived  in  the  appendix  are  labelled  - and
later  referred  to - with  a letter  A followed  by a number.
32assume  t < 1),  and (ili)  the  term (w  + r + c +  s'T  I)  Is  positive  by (7).
Proof  of Proposition  2
Let  us first  derive  the  expression  for  the  equilibrium  non-contractual
component  of the  income  generated  by the  firm,  Y  ,  or,  equivalently,  y (Y  =
Ny).  From  equation  (5)  (dropping  the  terms  containing  hi since  they  represent
at this  stage  an unnecessary  complication)  one  obtains
ex  =1  + A  (w  + r + c  + s'TI)a +  as'
I  I  1 + a  (a  - +a-+  1)(l  - t  + s')  (a  +-1)(1 - t  +  s'  I
Collecting  the  eIx terms,  and remembering  that (w  + r + c +  sWT)a  =
(A  + 1)(1 - t + s')x0 (from (6))
ex  - (  t +(s' + a( 1 )t)  - xl - x0)  (Al)
Using  the  definition  of y and (Al)
N
)  Z  1+  A  =  Ox-  (A2)
N[l  +  1  t-s  a)J 
where  io,  io  =  i  (x0),  is  number  of  workers  not  providing  non-contractual
contributions  of effort.
Comparative  statics  performed  on equation  (A2),  using (6),  again
n  ynl  I0
dropping  the  term  containing  ho,  and  defining  y  =  and  G(x)=  N  yields
dy  1  +  A  d
dc  1  1  +  N  E  dxc
1  - t  - 0  1  0
(1  - G)a  [1  +  (1  +  t  +sdy
(1  - t  +  s')  +  (1  - t)a  dc
dy Solving  the  above  equation  for  dc,  one  obtains
dy  =  - a(i - G)[(1  - t + s')  +  (1 - t)a +  (1  + t  + s)(1  - G) a] 1
which  is  unambiguously  negative:  a,  (1  - G),  and  s'  are  positive  by
definition,  and  0  < t  < 1,  so  all  of the  multiplicands  on  the  right  hand  side
33are  positive.
Proof  of Proposition  3
Comparative  statics  performed  on equation  (A2)  with  respect  to s'  yields
dy  d  1  +  (x-  x
dsdr  s  1+  ita  N  IL  £
- (1  +  A)(1  - t  +  s')(1  - G)a
1(1  - t +  s')  +  (1  - t)al(A  +  1)(1  - t + s') 2
((n  + (1  s  +  t)  ddX(1  - t +  s')  - (w  + r +  c  +  s'T))
where  C=  (1  - t)a  t  1 +A  E  (x - x0).
[1  - t  + s')  + (1 -a  t)  N  I  °
0
Solving  the  above  equation  for  dy,
ds'
dy-  CIC2  a(  G-x) )(c  +  x)  +  r - (1  - tn)  (A3)
ds'  ~~~~C  +  C 
2  3
denoting  C2= [(1  - t + s')  +  (1  - t)a](1  - t +  s'),  and  C  =  (1  - G)  (1  +  t
+  s)(1  - t  +  s')a.  Note that  C  , i  =  1, ... ,  3, are  positive,  as is the  a(l  -
G(x  )  term.  The sign  of  dy  thus  depends  on the  utmost  right  bracketed o  ds'
expression  of the  numerator.  With  c +  w + r being  positive,  dy  is  positive  as ds,
long  as (c  + w  +  r) > (1  - t)I.  For  sufficiently  profitable  firms,  however,  (c
+  w +  r) < (1  - t)1T,  and  thus  d,  is  negative.
Proof  of Proposition  4
dx
Let  us  first  compute  dt°  by differentiating  (6):
dx-  a(Y  + td  +  (1  +  s)dYd( 1 - t  +  s')  + a(w  +  r + c + s'I) =  -t  (A4) dt  (1  + A)(1  - t  +  s')2
Differentiating  (A2)  and  using  (A4),  remembering  that  r  =  ty,  and
34dropping,  for  simplicity,  additive  s' terms  (being  of second  order  magnitude)
yields
dy  l  +  x  - ~(  dt°  (x  - x )d-t°)=
a)ldt  I  G  dt
= 1  - °~  ((2  +  s)y +  c + c - (1  +  s)yn +  (1  +  t +  s)(l - t)dY)
(I+  a)(1  t)2 r  t  )
(AS)
Solving (A5) for dY yields
dy  a(l - G(xl  )) (2 + s)y +  c +  c - (1  +
OM  (-+  a) +  a(l + s)(l - G(x0)) - t(l +  aG(x))]  (A6)
All  the  multiplicative  terms  of the  ratio  on the  right  hand  side  are
positive  - also the  last  term  of the  numerator,  since  y and  yn  are  of the  same
order  of  magnitude,  and  c and  w  are  positive  - so (A6)  implies  that  dY  <  0. dt
Since  the  number  of workers  is  fixed  by assumption,  this  completes  the  proof
of Proposition  4.
Proof  of  Proposition  5
Inserting  (A6)  into  (8)  (dropping  the  argument  of the  G function)  gives
(1  +  t +  s)a(l - G)  (2  +  s)y +  c +  w - (1  +  s)yfn]
Y  Yd  (1  - t)[(l  +  a) +  a(l +  s)(l - G) - t(l +  aG)]  0
Multiplying  the  above  equation  with  the  denominator  of the  utmost  right  term
and dividing it by y (1 - G)a, -anoting  m =  and A =  c +  ,  - C  +
yields
((1  - t[  + a) - t(l +  aG)] +  (1  +  s)(l - t))(m  1)
- [(2  +  s)m +  A](1 +  t +  s) =  0
Rearranging (adding and subtracting (1 - t)(m - 1) and [(2  +  s)m  +  A] terms),
and  and  defining  b =  aCi  - G(x  yields
(b - l)(m - 1)(1  - t)2 +  (2(2 +  s)m +  A - 2 - s)  1  - t) -
35- ((2  + s)m + A)(2 + s) =  0  (A7)
Equation  (A7),  determining  the  optimal  tax  rate  of the  decisive  (median)
worker,  is  quadratic  in  t - 1. However,  since  G(x  )  and  m also  depend  on t,
the  left  hand side  cannot  be treated  as a  quadratic  function  of t.  To derive
the  relationship  between  t and  m which  renders  the  model  empirical
verifiability,  therefore,  one  must  also  specify  the  relation  between  the
participation  in the  provision  of  non-contractual  contributions,  G(x  ),  and  a
ax
tax  rate.  From (6),  - 0  < 0, so it seems reasonable to ass-me
3[lnG(x 0)]  a  t)_ 
6[ln(1  It)l  =  - 1.  Total  differentiation  of (A7)  then  yields
d(l - t)  (b  - 1)(I  - t)2  + 2(2 + s)(i - t) - (2 + s)
dm  bG(x )
(m - 1)(1  - t)(2(b - 1) - - -GTxj  + (4  + 2s)m  +  A - 2 - s
(A8)
To complete  the  proof  of Proposition  5, one  must  prove  that  the  right
hand  side  of (A8)  is  negative.  While  this  is not  true  in  general,  one  can  show
that  both the  numerator  and  denominator  of the  ratio  on the  right-hand-side
are  positive  for  economically  meaningful  values  of the  above  parameters:
(i)  The  denominator  is  positive,  as long  as m > 1,  0 < t  < 1,  G s .5).
(ii)  The  numerator  is  positive  for  t < .33  (assuming  a =  1  and  G = 0.5).
APPENDIX  2: DATA  SOURCES  AND  VARIABLES  USED IN  THE  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS
The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on the  sample  of 403  Slovenian
manufacturing  units  engaged  directly  in  production,  for 1986.  The  units  are
either  Basic  or so-called  lJniform  Organizations  of  Associated  Labor.  To allow
for  the  possibility  of industry  level  analysis,  19 industries  (defined  at the
lowest,  5-digit  level)  with 10  or  more  firms  were  selected  (drawn  and  rolled
steel;  cast  metal  products;  production  of bricks;  manufacturing  of building
36materials;  sawmilling;  manufacturing  of boards;  furniture;  paper  and  paper
products;  manufacture  of cotton  fabrics;  manufacture  of  wool  fabrics;
knitwear;  underwear;  garment;  footwear;  bread  and  pastry;  vegetable  and  fruit
processing;  slaughtering;  wine  production;  and  printing).  The  enterprises  of
the  sample  account  for  approximately  10%  of total  GMP  of the  Republic  of
Slovenia,  the  most  developed  among  the  republJcs  and  autonomous  provinces  of
Yugoslavia.
The  data  were  obtained  from  The  Social  Accounting  Service  of  Slovenia
(accounting  data--for  each  firm  It contains  149  v,Liables  of tne  income
statement,  362  variables  of the  balance  sheet,  and 110  variables  of
special  accounting  data),  and  from  The  Statistical  Office  of  Slovenia  (data  on
labor  turnover,  professional  educatlon,  and  personal  earnings  distribution).
The  variables  used in the  empirical  testing  of the  model  are  defined  as
follows  (the  calculation  of c and  s' Is  given  in the  text):
INC  - gross  Income  of the  firm (revenues  minus  material  costs);
NSUBS  - net  subsidies  of the  firm (obtained  from  the  Income  statement  and the
balance  sheet;  for  details,  see  Vodopivec,  1989);
K - value  of fixed  assets  in  use (at  the  end  of the  year);
N - number  of working  hours,  defined  as number  of hours  paid  corrected  for  the
number  of hours  spent  on sick  leaves;
E - average  duration  of the  professional  education  of  workers,  In  years
(available  only  at the  Industry  level);
m - the  ratio  of the  mean  to  median  oersonal  earnings  of the  firm,  computed  on
the  basis  of the  number  of  workers  falling  in  fourteen  personal  earnings
brackets  as of March  1986;
TURN  - labor  turnover,  defined  as the  percentage  of the  sum  of separations
and  hirings  In the  total  number  of workers  of the  firm (as  of March  1986);
37SICK - the  percentage  of sick  leaves  in  total  hours  paid;
CREATE  - the  percentage  of personal  earnings  paid  as a reward  to Individuals
for  rationalizations  and innovations.
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